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THE SCARLET L: HAVE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN LOBBYING REGULATION GONE TOO FAR?
Brian W. Schoeneman+
The American people are tired of a Washington that's only open
to those with the most cash and the right connections. They're tired
of a political process where the vote you cast isn't as important as the
favors you can do. And they're tired of trusting us with their tax
dollars when they see them spent on frivolous pet projects and
corporate giveaways.'
President Barack Obama's words aptly define the image the word
"lobbying" brings to mind for many Americans. 2 While the word "lobbyist"
has become a pejorative in many ways, 3 it is important to remember that
lobbying relates directly to some of America's most fundamental rights
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
M.A., 2004, The George Washington University Graduate School of Political Management; B.A.,
2001, The George Washington University. The author is the political and legislative director of
the Seafarers International Union of North America (AFL-CIO). He has lobbied on maritime and
labor issues since 2003, and served for a year as a Special Assistant to the Secretary at the U.S.
Department of Labor during the Bush administration. He was a registered lobbyist from 2003 to
2008 and again from 2009 to the present. The author would like to thank his wife, KayAnn, his
son, Nicholas, and his former Labor Department colleague, Nicholas Geale, Esq., for their
support, guidance, and expertise in developing this Comment.
1. Senator Barack Obama, Address at the Lobbying Reform Summit at the National Press
Club (Jan. 26, 2006) (transcript available at http://obamaspeeches.com/047-Lobbying-Reform-
Summit-National-Press-Club-Obama-Speech.htm). Although President Obama gave this speech
while he was a senator, he echoed these sentiments in the 2010 State of the Union address:
We face a deficit of trust-deep and corrosive doubts about how Washington works
that have been growing for years. To close that credibility gap we have to take action
on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue-to end the outsized influence of lobbyists; to do
our work openly; to give our people the government they deserve....
That's what I came to Washington to do. . . . That's why we've excluded lobbyists
from policymaking jobs, or seats on federal boards and commissions.
But we can't stop there. It's time to require lobbyists to disclose each contact they
make on behalf of a client with my administration or with Congress. It's time to put
strict limits on the contributions that lobbyists give to candidates for federal office.
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address (Jan. 27,
2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
state-union-address) [hereinafter State of the Union Address].
2. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to
Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 522, 524 (2007).
3. See To Lobby (v.): To Be Part of a Basic American Tradition, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2007),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0207/2677.html.
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enshrined in the First Amendment.4 Yet despite its historically important role,
lobbying has also been a constant target of political posturing.5 As recently as
the 2006 and 2008 federal-election cycles, lobbyist influence over the political
process was contentious.6 Major political change-such as the "Republican
Revolution" of 1994, the Democratic recapture of the House and Senate in
2006, and the Republican resurgence in 2010-is often foreshadowed by
corruption scandals, sometimes involving lobbyists.7
As partisan control shifted, both parties enacted reforms designed to stamp
out the potential corruption of lobbying. In 1995, the Republican majority
enacted the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), the first major lobbying
reform in almost half a century. 8 Likewise, in 2007, the first piece of
legislation introduced by the Senate's Democratic majority was the Honest
Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA). 9 Finally, within
weeks of winning the 2008 presidential election, President-elect Barack
Obama announced new rules to limit the influence of lobbyists on his
administration. 1
Shortly after taking office, the Obama administration announced sweeping
new rules that effectively prohibited executive-branch officials from engaging
in oral conversations with registered lobbyists on certain issues," including
discussions about the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, commonly
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Alan B. Morrison, Introduction: Lobbyists-Saints or
Sinners?, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 1 (2008).
5. See 2 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE 1789-1989: ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 491-508 (1991).
6. See David Mattingly & Joe Johns, Analysis: Obama, McCain Both Have Lobbyist Ties,
CNN.COM (July 29, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/29/lobbyists/index.html?
iref=allsearch; The Insider's Guide to the U.S. Mid-Terms, CNN.COM (Oct. 31, 2006),
http://articles.cnn.com/2006-10-31 /politics/insider.midtermsI mid-term-elections-bush-seats? s
=PM:POLITICS.
7. See Nicholas W. Allard, Lobbying Is an Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition
and the Competition to Be Right, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 26 n.8 (2008); DAVID MASON,
HERITAGE FOUND., TIME TO RESOLVE THE HOUSE POST OFFICE SCANDAL (1994),
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1994/02/EM375nbsp-Time-to-Resolve-
the-House (discussing the House Post Office scandal).
8. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 & 18 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)); William V. Luneberg,
The Evolution of Federal Lobbying Regulation: Where We Are Now and Where We Should Be
Going, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85, 86 (2009).
9. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat.
735 (codified in scattered sections of2 & 18 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2009)).
10. Press Release, The Office of the President-Elect, Obama Transition Announces Rules
for Lobbyists in Transition (Nov. I1, 2008), available at http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/
obama transition announcesrules-for-lobbyists in transition/.
I1. Ensuring Responsible Spending of Recovery Act Funds, Memorandum of March 20,
2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 12,531, 12,533 (Mar. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Presidential Memorandum of
March 20].
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known as the "Stimulus,"1 2 and the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).13
With these newest rules, the lobbying community and public interest groups
have questioned whether the White House has gone too far in regulating
lobbying.14 The administration has begun to adopt prohibitions and bans on
certain communications between officials and lobbyists, moving away from
the current law's focus on recordkeeping and disclosure.15
This Comment argues that the administration's attempt to bar certain
lobbyist contact with executive-branch officials violates the First Amendment
protections of speech and petition. By branding lobbyists with a "scarlet
letter," 16 the White House tramples upon some of the oldest and most
important rights of a free society.
This Comment examines the issues surrounding the Obama administration's
lobbying ban on the Stimulus. First, this Comment defines lobbying and
reviews the history of the right to petition, including the lobbying reforms of
1946, 1995, and 2007 and pertinent case law. Next, this Comment reviews the
administration's new approach to lobbying policy. Then, it analyzes the
administration's policies to determine their constitutionality. Finally, this
Comment discusses the administration's efforts and the future of lobbying
reform and concludes that greater transparency, rather than bans on speech, is
the best way to ensure a proper balance of constitutional rights and
governmental integrity.
12. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
13. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15 & 31 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. 11 2009)).
This Comment focuses on the Stimulus lobbying rules. The TARP rules are similar in some
ways, but they contain some specific differences which are beyond the scope of this Comment.
For an in-depth analysis of the TARP rules, see Daniel Schuman, The TARP Lobbying Rules:
What They Say and What They Mean for Transparency, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Oct. 15, 2009,
9:37 AM), http://blog.sunlightfoundation.com/2009/10/15/tarp-lobbying-rules/.
14. See, e.g., Lobbying Restrictions Generate More Criticism, OMBWATCH.ORG (May 6,
2009), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/9970.
15. See Presidential Memorandum of March 20, supra note I1; see also Lobbying
Restrictions Generate More Criticism, supra note 14.
16. The term "scarlet letter" comes from Nathaniel Hawthorne's novel, The Scarlet Letter,
about Hester Prynne, a woman who is forced to wear the letter "A" embroidered on her dress to
signify that she is an adulterer. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 57-58 (Ross C.
Murfin ed., 1991) (1850). The embroidered letter "had the effect of a spell, taking her out of the
ordinary relations with humanity, and inclosing her in a sphere by herself." Id. at 58. Some
argue that the Obama administration's tough regulations on lobbyists have branded lobbyists with
a type of scarlet letter. See Manuel Roig-Franzia, The Insider's Insider, WASH. POST, Aug. 24,
2009, at Cl (noting that Heather Podesta and other lobbyists wore red, gothic L's on their
clothing during the Democratic National Convention in 2008 as a way of "razzing" candidate
Obama for his attacks on lobbying).
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1. THE RIGHT TO PETITION AND THE MODERN PROFESSION OF LOBBYING
In order to better understand the modem profession of lobbying and the
evolution of the right to petition, "lobbying" must be defined. The historical
evolution of the right to petition-the fundamental right allowing lobbying to
flourish-must also be explored.' 7 The right to petition permits and protects
the existence of lobbying and the lobbying profession.' 8 Defining "lobbying"
and reviewing the evolution of the right to petition provides the proper context
for an analysis of the administration's oral-communications ban.
A. Lobbying Defined: Easier Said Than Done
"Lobbying" may seem relatively easy to define. Black's Law Dictionary
provides three definitions of "lobbying": "(1) To talk with or curry favor with a
legislator ... in an attempt to influence the legislator's vote . .. (2) To support
or oppose (a measure) by working to influence a legislator's vote ... (3) To try
to influence (a decision-maker) . . . ."1 As Black's demonstrates, the most
fundamental definition of "lobbying" is an attempt to influence "a decision-
maker." 20  Yet, despite the common usage of "lobbying," the dictionary
definitions are vague. The definitions do not indicate how one "curries favor,"
nor do they indicate if lobbying is restricted to elected officials.
Unfortunately, the statutory definitions have similar problems. Federal law
provides different definitions of lobbyin, 21 reflecting two different
philosophies.22 The first philosophy, reflected in the Internal Revenue Code,
defines "lobb ing" based on the government action the lobbying group wishes
to influence.2 The second philosophy, reflected in the LDA, focuses on which
government actor is being influenced and defines various government actors.24
The various definitions encompass a wide array of lobbying behaviors, but
each definition covers different behaviors. For example, the Internal Revenue
17. See Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a
Constitutional Right to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 180-81 (1993).
18. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("While the term
'lobbyist' has become encrusted with invidious connotations, every person or group
engaged ... in trying to persuade Congressional action is exercising the First Amendment right of
petition.").
19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1022 (9th ed. 2009).
20. Id.
21. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is this "Lobbying" that We Are So Worried About?, 26
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 485, 508 n.89 (2008). The Internal Revenue Code contains three
definitions of "lobbying." See I.R.C. §§ 162(e), 501(c)(3), 4911 (2006). Another definition is
located in the LDA/HLOGA. See 2 U.S.C § 1602 (2006 & Supp. 11 2009).
22. See Mayer, supra note 21, at 509.
23. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see Mayer, supra note 21, at 509 (discussing this Internal Revenue
Code definition).
24. 2 U.S.C. § 1602(3), (4), (8)(a); see Mayer, supra note 21, at 511 (discussing the
definition of "lobbying" as set forth in the LDA).
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Code defines "grassroots lobbying," but the LDA does not.2 5 Likewise, the
Tax Code definitions include state and local lobbying, whereas the LDA
definition focuses solely on federal lobbying. 26
The LDA defines "lobbying activities" as "lobbying contacts and efforts in
support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities,
research and other background work that is intended, at the time it is
performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of
others." 27 A "lobbying contact" is
any oral or written communication (including an electronic
communication) to a covered executive branch official or a covered
legislative branch official that is made on behalf of a client with
regard to-
(i) the formulation, modification, or adoption of Federal
legislation (including legislative proposals);
(ii) the formulation, modification, or adoption of a Federal rule,
regulation, Executive order, or any other program, policy, or position
of the United States Government;
(iii) the administration or execution of a Federal program or
policy (including the negotiation, award, or administration of a
Federal contract, grant, loan, permit, or license); or
(iv) the nomination or confirmation of a person for a position
subject to confirmation by the Senate. 28
Finally, the LDA defines a "lobbyist" as an individual working for a "client
for financial or other compensation for services that include more than one
lobbying contact," unless the individual devotes less than twenty percent of the
individual's time to lobbying activities over a three-month period.
The LDA, including its exceptions, provides a good baseline for
understanding modem lobbying. This definition of "lobbying" allows for a
25. Compare 1.R.C. § 4911(c), with 2 U.S.C. § 1602(7). The Government Accountability
Office (GAO)-formerly the General Accounting Office-defined "grassroots lobbying" as
"efforts to influence legislation by influencing the public's view of that legislation," and noted
that the Internal Revenue Code definition captured this type of lobbying behavior but the LDA
definition did not. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-38, FEDERAL LOBBYING:
DIFFERENCES IN LOBBYING DEFINITIONS AND THEIR IMPACT I 1 & app. 1, at 30. This Comment
will not focus on grassroots lobbying.
26. Compare I.R.C. § 4911, with 2 U.S.C. § 1602. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, supra note 25.
27. 2 U.S.C. § 1602(7) (2006). This Comment uses the LDA definition of "lobbying
activities," "lobbying contacts," and "lobbyists."
28. Id. § 1602(8)(A). Exceptions to "lobbying activities" include congressional testimony,
id. § 1602(8)(B)(vii), publicly disseminated speeches or broadcasts, id. § 1602(8)(B)(viii), or
requests for information about a single individual's federal benefits, id. § 1602(8)(B)(xvi). The
LDA includes nineteen different exceptions for oral or written communications that are not
considered lobbying. Id § 1602(8)(B).
29. Id § 1602(10).
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detailed look at the historical evolution of the practice in America, beginning
with the right to petition.
B. The Right to Petition in Anglo-American Jurisprudence
Although "the right of petition is not synonymous with a right to lobby,"
lobbying is fundamentally a form of petitioning and is inextricably intertwined
with the historical right to petition. 30  Predating the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution and Bill of Rights,31 the right to petition allows citizens to engage
the government directly to influence policy and to obtain redress for
grievances, among other things.3 2 Traditionally, the right to petition focused
on writings, but it has since expanded to all forms of communication.34
The right to petition's roots in North America predate the American
Revolution by over a century.35 The first codification of the right to petition
36occurred in Massachusetts in 1642. By the time of the American Revolution,
30. See Thomas, supra note 17, at 184.
31. See Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging . An Analysis of the
Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (1986). The
right to petition the government for a redress of grievances is an "ancient right." Id at 1153. At
least one early petition dates back as far as the reign of Anglo-Saxon King Athelred the Unready.
Id. at 1154 (noting the first recorded petition to King Athelred from his nobles in 1013,
demanding his return after he fled England for France). Two centuries later, as part of a sweeping
recognition of rights, the Magna Carta included a specific right to petition in Clause 61:
[S]o that if [the king] ... offend[s] against anyone in any way, or transgress[es] any of
the articles of peace or security, and the offence is indicated to four of the aforesaid
twenty-five barons, those four barons shall come to us or our justiciar, if we are out of
the kingdom, and shall bring it to our notice and ask that we have it redressed without
delay.
J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA app. 6 at 471 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1992).
32. See Smith, supra note 31, at 1178-80.
33. See idat 1189.
34. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (1968) (stating categorically that an
attempting to persuade Congress was acting within the right of petition).
35. See Smith, supra note 31, at 1170.
36. Id. In response to the citizenry's fears of an overly powerful magistracy, Governor John
Winthrop of the Massachusetts Bay Colony commissioned a body of men to draw up a system of
laws for the colony. Id. This system of laws, known as the Massachusetts Body of Liberties,
explicitly protected the right to petition. THE BODY OF LIBERTIES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
COLONY IN NEW ENGLAND art. 12 (1641), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
ENGLAND AND AMERICA: FROM MAGNA CHARTA TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1789 57,
59 (Francis Bowen ed., 1854). Article Twelve stated:
Every man, whether inhabitant or foreigner, free or not free, shall have liberty to come
to any public court, council, or town-meeting, and, either by speech or by writing, to
move any lawful, seasonable, and material question, or to present any necessary
motion, complaint, petition, bill, or information, whereof that meeting hath proper
cognizance, so it be done in convenient time, due order, and respective manner.
Id. This was the first time that the right to petition had been enacted as part of a system of laws.
Smith, supra note 31, at 1170. As the colonies matured, the right to petition continued to play an
important role in colonial affairs. Id. at I 173-74 (noting that the right to petition was included in
510 [Vol. 60:505
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the right to petition had become nearly sacrosanct, as confirmed by a pointed
reference in the Declaration of Independence to King George III's failure to
respond to colonial petitions. During the federal constitution ratification
debates a decade later, four states-Mar'land, New York, North Carolina, and
Virginia-conditioned their ratification votes on the inclusion of the right to
petition in the text.38
Following the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, James Madison began
drafting a variety of amendments, including the First Amendment." The
Senate later amended Madison's language and included language protecting
the freedom to petition, creating the final form of the First Amendment.40
C. The Constitutional Right to Petition
Over half a century after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme
41Court considered its first case impacting the right to petition, Crandall v.
42Nevada. The Court held that Nevada could not impose a tax on persons
passing through the state because doing so infringed on a person's ability to
petition the government.43 A decade later, in United States v. Cruikshank, the
Court confirmed more emphatically the importance of the right to petition,
stating that "[t]he very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a
right on the part of its citizens ... to petition for a redress of grievances.'"
declarations by a number of colonial conventions, the Stamp Act Congress of 1765, and the First
Continental Congress in 1774).
37. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776) ("In every stage of these
Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions
have been answered only by repeated injury.").
38. See Smith, supra note 31, at 1174.
39. See id at 1175. The first draft of the First Amendment included language ensuring the
right of the people "to apply to the government for redress of grievances." THE COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 143 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
41. Smith, supra note 31, at 1183-84.
42. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867). In Crandall, the Court found that
[a citizen] has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may
have upon that government, or to transact any business he may have with it. To seek its
protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. . .. [A]nd this
right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in
the exercise of it.
Id
43. Id. at 43-44. The Court reasoned that because an individual may need to travel to
Washington in order to present a petition, the First Amendment implied a right to interstate travel.
Id. at 44.
44. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
5112011]
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Later, in Thomas v. Collins, the Court determined that the right to etition is
"inseparable" from the other rights granted by the First Amendment.
However, like the other First Amendment clauses, the Court soon found
46exceptions limiting the right to petition. The first meaningful restriction
arose in 1961 in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., in which the Court reco nized in dicta a "sham exception" to the
right to petition in antitrust litigation.4
The Court did not determine whether the right to petition was limited in the
same way the Court had determined the freedoms of speech and press were
limited until 19 85 ,48 when it brought the right to petition in line with the rest of
its First Amendment jurisprudence.49 In McDonald v. Smith, the Court found
that "[t]he right to petition is guaranteed; the right to commit libel with
impunity is not."s0 The First Amendment prohibits individuals from using a
petition to engage in what would be restricted behavior under the Court's free-
speech or free-press jurisprudence.5 Given this holding, an analysis of future
legislation implicating the right to petition would likely include the same
analysis reserved for potential violations of other First Amendment rights.52
As this brief history shows, the right to petition has maintained a prominent
position in the English common law and American constitutional traditions.
45. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ("It was not by accident or coincidence
that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of
the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not
identical, are inseparable.").
46. See Smith, supra note 31, at 1183-85.
47. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961);
see Smith, supra note 3 1, at 1184. In Noerr, the Court noted that if Noerr had used the right of
petition as a pretext for engaging in otherwise unlawful behavior, the right would not have
shielded the company from liability. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. The Court reaffirmed this
exception. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972) (allowing
court petitions against competitors' applications); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657, 670 (1965) (finding that union lobbying efforts were not a violation of the Sherman Act); see
Smith, supra note 31, at 1192 n.229.
48. Smith, supra note 31, at 1184-85.
49. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985). McDonald arose after McDonald sent a
number of letters, containing potentially libelous claims, to President Reagan opposing the
potential nomination of Smith for U.S. Attorney. Id. at 480-81. McDonald argued that the letters
were protected under the right to petition. Id. at 481-82. The Court held that "[t]he right to
petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of that Amendment, and is an assurance
of a particular freedom of expression." Id. at 482.
50. Id. at 485.
5 1. Id (explaining that because the rights in the First Amendment are inseparable, the right
to petition should be limited in accordance with the right of free speech and freedom of the press).
52. See Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 9-13 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (analyzing the
National Association of Manufacturers's claims that HLOGA violates its First Amendment rights
under a strict scrutiny analysis).
[Vol. 60:505512
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Respect for the right to petition underlies the current American regime of
lobbying regulation.53
D. Lobbying Regulation in America
From the founding of the English colonies in North America, lobbying has
been a part of American politics. 54 The adoption of the Constitution itself was
influenced heavily by the lobbying efforts of the Federalists.55  However,
colonial lobbying bore little resemblance to the scope or goals of modem
lobbying.56 Unlike modem lobbying, ad hoc committees that came together
for a specific purpose and disbanded once that purpose had been achieved or
their efforts had failed were the primary colonial lobbyists. Without
regulations, many practices currently viewed as corrupt were accepted.
53. See 2 U.S.C. § 1607 (2006) ("Nothing in this [Act] shall be construed to prohibit or
interfere with (1) the right to petition the Government for the redress of grievances.").
54. See Michael Barone, In Defense of Lobbyists, REALCLEARPOLITICS (June 14, 2008),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/06/in defense of lobbyists.html. In addition to
his many other endeavors, Benjamin Franklin was one of the first American lobbyists, sent to
England to represent Pennsylvania in the 1760s. Id
55. See Burdett Loomis, From the Framing to the Fifties: Lobbying in Constitutional and
Historical Contexts, EXTENSIONS (Fall 2006), http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/extensions/fall
2006/Loomis.pdf. The Federalist Papers, written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James
Madison can easily be viewed as lobbying materials: they were designed to influence the various
constitutional ratifying conventions and to create grassroots support from the general public. Id.
The public, in turn, would pressure its representatives in those conventions to ratify the
Constitution. Madison, Jay, and Hamilton's efforts were successful; the Federalist Papers played
a significant role in shaping public opinion in favor of the new Constitution. Id
Madison recognized the potential impact that lobbying could have on the nascent American
government. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 56, 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Madison wrote extensively about the threat of "faction" to American democracy. Id at 56-58.
Although he recognized the threat, he also understood that there was no way to guard against the
threat completely without destroying the Republic he had endeavored to create. Id. at 60 ("[T]he
causes of faction cannot be removed . . . relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its
effects."). His definition of "faction" is similar to perceptions of lobbying that still persist to this
day. See STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 99TH CONG.,
CONGRESS AND PRESSURE GROUPS: LOBBYING IN A MODERN DEMOCRACY I (Comm. Print
1986) [hereinafter PRESSURE GROUPS]. Despite Madison's fear of faction, his own efforts were a
part of one of the first successful examples of grassroots lobbying in American history.
56. See PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 2, 10. After the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution, lobbyists flocked to the early American Congress. Id at 2. One of the earliest
recorded lobbyists at the time was William Hull, a Revolutionary War veteran. Peter Grier, The
Lobbyist Through History: Villainy and Virtue, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sept. 28, 2009),
http://features.csmonitor.com/politics/2009/09/28/the-lobbyist-through-history-villainy-and-
virtue/. Hull was sent to Philadelphia by veterans from Virginia to lobby Congress and President
George Washington to provide back pay for soldiers who had served in the Revolution. See 133
CONG. REC. S25,410 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1987) (discussing Hull's role). His efforts, though
unsuccessful, were representative of early lobbying under the new Constitution. Grier, supra.
57. See PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 2.
58. See, e.g., id For example, the lobbying efforts of Nicholas Biddle, President of the
Bank of the United States, included providing loans on favorable terms to legislators and paying
2011] 513
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Lobbying first began to resemble its modem equivalent when political
opinion regarding federal funding of local projects evolved during the 1820s
and 1830s. 5 By the Civil War, Congress supported more internal
improvements than it had previously, and lobbyists fought furiously over
federal appropriations. 6 0  These lobbyists were key in passing a variety of
railroad-related legislation, including laws allowing railroads to exchange
worthless desert land, needed for track right-of-ways, for more profitable
federal land elsewhere.61
retainers to elected officials who were inclined to support the Bank. See JON MEACHAM,
AMERICAN LION 208-09 (Random House Trade Paperbacks ed. 2009) (recounting a story told by
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney during a shared carriage ride with an anti-Bank congressman who
later voted for the Bank after receiving a $20,000 loan). Biddle's efforts to secure a recharter of
the Bank during the Jackson administration were led by a lobbyist few could rival for influence:
Senator Daniel Webster. PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 2. Biddle paid Senator Webster a
retainer to lead the push for the Bank's recharter in Congress. See id.; see also 133 CONG. REC.
S25,410 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1987). Senator Webster wrote an extraordinary letter to Biddle that
read, "I believe my retainer has not been renewed or refreshed as usual. If it be wished that my
relation to the bank should be continued, it may be well to send me the usual retainers." See
PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 2. Similar "sweetheart deals" today by mortgage
companies like Countrywide Financial caused serious damage to the reputations of a number of
high-ranking senators, including former Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT), and sparked widespread
calls for hearings and investigations. Dodd and Countrywide, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at
A16. Despite this example of modern blatant corruption, to this day Senator Webster enjoys an
unstained reputation as one of the lions of the Senate and heroes of the nation. MEACHAM, supra,
at 13(0-31.
59. See MEACHAM, supra note 58, at 56. Beginning in Andrew Jackson's presidency,
political opinion shifted on the issue of federal infrastructure spending, with Congress supporting
more local projects than had been the case in the past. Id at 137. Providing public funding for
internal improvements was not always viewed as a fundamental role of the federal government.
Id at 56. The "internal improvement" debates split the Democratic and National
Republican/Whig parties during the first half of the nineteenth century. Id at 56, 289. Jackson
opposed the use of federal funds on local-level and state-level internal improvements, but his
opponents, like John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, strongly supported the use of federal funds
for infrastructure. Id. at 56. Despite President Jackson's reticence, the federal government began
to spend more and more on internal improvements. Id. at 139. By the end of president Jackson's
final term in office, he had authorized more federal funds for internal improvements than the prior
six presidents combined. Id.
60. PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 3. During this period, one of the more famous
apocryphal anecdotes about lobbying originated. President Ulysses S. Grant would often visit the
lobby of the Willard Hotel, next to the White House. Interview by Liane Hansen with Barbara
Bahny, Pub. Relations Dir., The Willard Intercontinental Hotel, in D.C. (Jan. 15, 2006) (transcript
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5158557). His visits soon
became well known and petitioners would frequent the lobby, leading Grant to dub them
"lobbyists." Id This version of the etymology of "lobbyist" is still often referred to today and is
referenced by the Willard Intercontinental in its history of the hotel. Id.
61. PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 3. These laws led directly to the first major
lobbying scandal, the Crddit Mobilier Scandal of 1872. Id. The Union Pacific Railroad designed
Crddit Mobilier as a shell corporation to generate additional profits on the construction of the
transcontinental railroad by inflating costs. Id; see also EDWARD WINSLOW MARTIN, BEHIND
THE SCENES IN WASHINGTON: A COMPLETE AND GRAPHIC ACCOUNT OF THE CREDIT MOBILIER
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In the latter half of the nineteenth century, a significant expansion in
lobbying marked the final evolution into the current lobbying industry. 62 This
expansion in lobbying was followed shortly by the first attempt at a federal
regulation of lobbying.6 In 1876, the House of Representatives required
64lobbyists to register with the House Clerk, but because the requirement had
"only a limited life span, and failed to provide an enforcement mechanism," it
had little impact on lobbying. 65
The first significant investigation into lobbying in Congress occurred during
the Wilson administration. President Woodrow Wilson's unsuccessful
efforts to reduce the protective tariff resulted in significant public scrutiny of
the tariff lobby's efforts, particularly those of the National Association of
Manufacturers. 67 The Senate held a com Prehensive series of hearings, which
included testimony from sitting senators. 8 The first formal recommendation
for a lobbyist-registration law emerged from these hearings.69 That year, the
INVESTIGATION 248-63 (1873). When an investigation of Crddit Mobilier seemed imminent,
Congressman Oakes Ames of Massachusetts, who served as the President of Cr6dit Mobilier,
provided gifts of stock to influential members of Congress as part of his lobbying efforts for
Cr6dit Mobilier. PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 3. Recipients of Credit Mobilier stock
included Vice President Schuyler Colfax, Speaker of the House James G. Blaine, and future
President James A. Garfield. Id. In 1872, the New York Sun reported the facts of the scandal,
resulting in investigations in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the censuring of
one House member, and the recommended expulsion of another. Id The member recommended
for expulsion was not expelled because his term ended. Id.
62. PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 4. Formerly the province of general lobbyists
hired for a specific issue, lobbying shifted to a more permanent, in-house industry. Id Following
the shift, lobbyists tended to represent specific companies or industrial interests. Id During this
time, mass-reform movements, such as the labor movement and the temperance movement, made
their presences felt in the nation's capital and maintained in-house lobbyists. Id.
63. CRAIG HOLMAN, PUB. CITIZEN, ORIGINS, EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE
LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT 2-3 (2006), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
Origins%20of%20lobbying%20Disclosure%20Act.pdf.
64. Id. This registration was limited to one session of the 44th Congress. Id.
65. PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 8.
66. See Maintenance of a Lobby to Influence Legislation: Hearing on S. Res. 92 Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 63d Cong. 3-4 (1918) [hereinafter 1918 Senate Hearing]. President
Woodrow Wilson was an ardent opponent of lobbying. PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 6.
President Wilson's criticism of lobbying began long before his presidency. In 1885, he
recognized Congress's structural failures that promoted lobbying, particularly the structure of the
committee system. Id The House made sweeping changes to the committee system in 1911 that
curbed many of the abuses Wilson had criticized, but he still faced powerful lobbies when he
became president in 1913. Id. at 6-7. When President Wilson attempted to lower the protective
tariff, he was met with stiff resistance by tariff supporters-especially their lobbyists. Id at 7.
67. PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 7.
68. 1918 Senate Hearing, supra note 66. When Senator Henry F. Ashurst of Arizona was
asked about his knowledge of any lobbying on the tariff bill, he mentioned the efforts of a
particular lobbyist on Indian legislation, whom he characterized as "the smoothest lobbyist I ever
met. He could carry a bundle of eels upstairs and never drop one." Id. at 12.
69. PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 7.
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House passed a reform bill that ultimately failed in the Senate. 70 Over the next
twenty years, multiple bills requiring registration were introduced, but none
71were enacted.
In 1934, Congress successfully passed the first meaningful restriction on
lobbying.72 The law, enacted as an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code,
barred tax-exempt charitable organizations from lobbying as a substantial part
of their activities. 73 Although this was a major step forward, a decade passed
before Congress revisited lobbying regulations.74
E. Lobbying Regulation and Control from 1946 to 2008
Today, two primary means of regulating lobbying have emerged:
prohibitions and disclosures. 7 5 First, prohibitions focus on certain lobbying-
related activities that raise a specter of corruption.76 Second, disclosures focus
on making information available to the public, and they have been the focus of
three major reform laws passed in the twentieth century.77
The first comprehensive lobbying-reform law enacted was the Federal
78
Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 (FRLA). The law did little to curb
corruption and was viewed widely as ineffectual.79 Congress did not enact
another lobbying reform bill for fifty years-the Lobbying Disclosure Act of
1995 (LDA). The LDA repealed FRLA and created the modem transparency
system that remains the backbone of lobbying regulation. Congress amended
the LDA by enacting the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of
70. Id.
71. Id at 8-9.
72. Id. at 9.
73. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
74. PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 9-10.
75. See Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16
CORNELL. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 17 (2006).
76. See id These include things such as gifts and honoraria for public officials,
2 U.S.C. § 1613 (2006), and revolving-door employment for elected and appointed officials, see,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2006 & Supp. 11 2009).
77. See Johnson, supra note 75; infra Part I.E.1-3.
78. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 839, repealed
by Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, P.L. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 & 18 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. 11 2009)); see also HOLMAN, supra note 63, at
4.
79. See Steven A. Browne, Note, The Constitutionality of Lobby Reform: Implicating
Associational Privacy and the Right to Petition the Government, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
717, 719 (1995) ("[The FRLA] is a poorly considered law based on little prior debate. The
legislation's inferior draftsmanship and subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court resulted
in an ineffective law.").
80. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 & 18 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)); see also HOLMAN,
supra note 63, at 8.
81. HOLMAN, supra note 63, at 7-8.
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2007 (HLOGA), which requires lobbyists to file more frequent and more
detailed lobbying disclosure reports.
1. What Might Have Been: The Federal Regulation ofLobbying Act of 1946
Congress passed the FRLA shortly after the end of World War II. 83
Following the major increase in federal power due to the war and the Great
84 8Depression, pressure to pass a lobbying-reform law reached its zenith.ss In
1945, Congress began a comprehensive organizational review.86 The review
included lobby reform, an issue that Congress had studied for over thirty-five
years.87 Despite this fact, the proposal itself was not debated at length before
being passed as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.88 Thus,
even after its passage, there was little belief that the FRLA would be
effective. 89
82. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat.
735 (codified in scattered sections of2 & 18 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2009)).
83. HOLMAN, supra note 63, at 4.
84. Gene Smiley, Great Depression, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 230,
230 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008).
85. See William P. Fuller, Congressional Lobbying Disclosure Laws: Much Needed
Reforms on the Horizon, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 419, 422-23 (1993) (noting concerns of
President Harry S. Truman and House Speaker Sam Rayburn with lobbying in Washington
following the end of World War 11).
86. See PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 55, at 41-42.
87. Id at 42.
88. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 839, repealed
by Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, P.L. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 & 18 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). In an introductory speech to the
legislation, Congressman Everett Dirksen remarked that the legislation was designed "to reach
those whose principal purpose, not incidental purpose, . . . is to come here and endeavor to
influence the passage of legislation either by bringing about its defeat or its enactment." 92
CONG. REC. 10,088 (daily ed. July 25, 1946). The report on the bill, which was included in the
Congressional Record, demonstrates that the drafters recognized the potential conflict with the
First Amendment. Id The report sets out a list of things that the FRLA is not intended to do, and
the very first item reads, "[the FRLA] does not curtail the right of free speech or freedom of the
press or the right of petition." Id. The Senate report accompanying the bill included some
cynical language about lobbyists, stating there is a
class of lobbyists . . . employed to come to the Capitol under the false impression that
they exert some powerful influence over Members of Congress. These individuals
spend their time in Washington presumably exerting some mysterious influence with
respect to the legislation in which their employers are interested. The title in no wise
prohibits or curtails their activities. It merely requires that they shall register and
disclose the sources and purposes of their employment and the amount of their
compensation.
Id. at 10,089. Regardless of this view of lobbying, the drafters recognized that the new law could
violate the right to petition. Dirksen made it clear that "[Congress has] no desire to restrict in the
slightest way the right of a citizen to petition his Government for a redress of grievances by
urging the passage or defeat of legislation." Id at 10,090.
89. See, e.g., Comment, Improving the Legislative Process: Federal Regulation of
Lobbying, 56 YALE L.J. 304, 331 (1947). Commentators believed:
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On its face, the law appears sweeping. 9 0 The Act required registration with
the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate of "[a]ny person who shall
engage himself for pay or for any consideration for the purpose of attempting
to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the
United States."9 This required disclosing who employed the lobbyist, how
long he would be employed for, how much he was being paid, who was paying
his salary, what he was to be paid for expenses, and what expenses were
included, as well as other minutiae.92 Violations of the Act were considered a
misdemeanor with a maximum fine of $5000 or up to twelve months
imprisonment, and a three-year bar on lobbying activities.9 3
The Act was problematic in a number of ways. Its ambiguous definition of
"lobbying" left open a multitude of lobbying activities, such as lobbying for
appointment confirmations and lobbying on issues lacking legislation.94 The
statute also completely ignored the executive branch, a major target for
lobbyists given administrative agencies' regulatory functions. Further, the
law only required registration for those who received funds that were
"principally to aid" or whose "principal purpose" was to influence the passage
or defeat of legislation. 96 The law's structure made registration avoidable. 97
It [wa]s probable that the Lobbying Act will prove largely ineffective. The
loopholes provided by the "principal" requirement, the incompleteness of the
information required to be filed, the lack of an adequate enforcement agency, and the
weakness of the publicity provisions may combine to make the Act as dead a law as
similar state statutes.
Id
90. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 841. Section 307 of the Act
applied to
any person . . . who . . . in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, solicits,
collects, or receives money or any other thing of value to be used principally to aid, or
the principal purpose of which person is to aid, in the accomplishment of any of the
following purposes:
(a) The passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States.
(b) To influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by
the Congress of the United States.
Id
91. Id
92. Id. at 841-42. The law also required groups to disclose to the House Clerk and
Secretary of the Senate the names and addresses of any individuals who contributed more than
$500 to the organization, if that organization was engaged in influencing Congress to pass or
defeat legislation. Id. at 840.
93. Id. at 842.
94. Hearing on Lobbying Reform Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Thomas M. Susman), available at
http://www.carmengroup.com/lobbying-reform.
95. See HOLMAN, supra note 63, at 5.
96. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, 60 Stat. at 841.
97. Fuller, supra note 85, at 427.
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Indeed, by the time Congress resolved these issues, "only 6000 of the reported
60,000 to 80,000 lobbyists in Washington had registered." 9 8
The courts did little to repair the FRLA's poor statutory structure. The
Supreme Court's interpretation of the law in United States v. Harriss construed
it in such a way as to render it meaningless. 99 In Harriss, the government
brought charges against an agricultural lobby for violating the FRLA's
reporting requirements. 00 Harriss argued that the law was unconstitutionally
vague, the registration requirements violated the First Amendment rights to
free speech and petition, and the penalty of a three-year bar violated the right
to petition. o0
The Court construed the FRLA narrowly.102 Although the Court may have
saved the language from being unconstitutionally vague, it also made the
statute unworkable.io3 Lobbyists and lawyers could easily maneuver around
the Court's narrowed definition to ensure they were outside the registration
requirements. 104 Despite this failure, a remedial lobbying-reform law was not
enacted until 1995.
2. Modern Reform and Oversight: The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995
Congress designed the Lobbying Disclosure Act to ameliorate many of the
problems created by the poor drafting of the FRLA and the Court's
construction under Harriss. 05 It successfully closed many of the largest
loopholes, including the weakness of the lobbying definitions and the focus on
congressional action. 06
Like the FRLA, the LDA is a registration law. The LDA requires lobbyists
to register with the Secretary of the Senate and the House Clerk within forty-
five days of their first lobbying contact or when they are first hired by a
98. See Gary Lee, Lobbyists Acknowledge Loopholes, WASH. POST, July 17, 1991, at A2l;
see also Fuller, supra note 85, at 427.
99. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 623 (1954); see HOLMAN, supra note 63, at 6.
100. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 614-15.
101. Id at 617.
102. Id. at 623. The Court held that
there are three prerequisites to coverage under § 307: (1) the "person" must have
solicited, collected, or received contributions; (2) one of the main purposes of such
"person," or one of the main purposes of such contributions, must have been to
influence the passage or defeat of legislation by Congress; (3) the intended method of
accomplishing this purpose must have been through direct communication with
members of Congress.
Id.
103. HOLMAN, supra note 63, at 6.
104. Id.
105. 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006) ("[E]xisting lobbying disclosure statutes have been ineffective
because of unclear statutory language, weak administrative and enforcement provisions, and an
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client.'o7 Reports must be filed semi-annually.108 In addition to the amount an
organization spends on lobbying, registrants must include a list of the issues on
which they worked, a list of the contacts made, and the names and titles of the
lobbyists employed on those issues. 0 9 Since the enactment of the LDA, the
number of registered lobbyists has increased from 10,798 in 1996 to 30,402 in
2004."0
Enforcement of the LDA changed significantly from the previous regime
under the FRLA. Under the LDA, failure to register was no longer a criminal
offense."' Instead, violations of the LDA were punishable by a civil fine of up
to $50,000. 112 Yet, despite this change in enforcement policy, the same
problems that plagued the FRLA plagued the LDA as well.1 3 According to
the Congressional Research Service, although there are conflicting reports on
enforcement data, generally few lobbyists who fail to file or correct an
incomplete filing are held accountable."
Overall, the LDA was a major improvement over the failed FRLA regulation
scheme. Given the number of registered lobbyists in the years following its
adoption, it represented a significant increase in compliance from the days of
the FRLA. However, despite the changes made, there was still room for
improvement.
3. Responding to Abramoff and Cunningham: The Honest Leadership and
Open Government Act of2007
Congress turned its attention back to the issue of lobbying reform following
a number of significant scandals in 2005. 115 As part of their political efforts,
Democrats, including former Speaker Nancy Pelosi, made ethics and lobbying
107. 2 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006).
108. Id § 1604(a). HLOGA amended this provision for semi-annual reports to require
quarterly filings. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 2 U.S.C. § 1604(a)
(Supp. 11 2009).
109. 2 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (2006).
110. See R. ERIC PETERSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LOBBYING REFORM: BACKGROUND
AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, 109TH CONGRESS 6 tbl.1 (2006), available at http://money
line.cq.com/flatfiles/editorialFiles/moneyLine/reference/crs/lobbying/crsl09gifts.pdf.
111. 2 U.S.C.§ 1606.
112. Id
113. See PETERSEN, supra note I10, at 6-7.
114. Id. (noting a claim from Senator Chris Dodd that the Senate's Office of Public Records
had referred over 2000 cases to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and heard nothing, and stating a
DOJ claim of 200 referrals with thirteen further enforcement actions, resulting in fines of $47,000
being collected).
115. See 153 CONG. REC. S220 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2007) (statement of Sen. Reid); see also
Tony Perry, Rep. Cunningham Pleads Guilty to Bribery, Resigns, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at
Al; Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, The Fast Rise and Steep Fall ofJack Abramoff WASH.
POST, Dec. 29, 2005, at Al.
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reform top priorities.116 The first bill introduced in the 110th Congress was the
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007.117 HLOGA passed
with bipartisan support and made the first significant changes to the LDA since
it was originally passed."'8 HLOGA represented a congressional response to
various lobbying-related scandals, including those of Duke Cunningham and
Jack Abramoff.ll 9
Given the pressure on Congress to reign in perceived abuses, HLOGA was a
high priority in the early days of the new Congress.120 It passed with bipartisan
support: 83-14 in the Senatel21 and a similarly lopsided 411-8 in the House of
Representatives.122
Unlike the LDA's repeal of FRLA, Congress did not design HLOGA as a
replacement for the LDA disclosure regime. Instead, Congress designed it to
expand provisions in the LDA and to increase disclosure requirements for
lobbyists. 123 Among other things, HLOGA increased the reporting
requirements for lobbyists from semiannually to quarterly.124
116. David Espo, Pelosi Says She Would Drain GOP "Swamp," WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/06/AR2006100600056.html.
117. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat.
735 (codified in scattered sections of2 & 18 U.S.C. (Supp. 11 2009)).
118. See id.; see also 153 CONG. REC. S 10,723 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007) (roll-call vote).
119. See Dorie Apollonio et. al, Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption
Paradigm, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 15-16 (2008) (discussing the Cunningham bribery case
and the Abramoff case in greater detail).
120. 153 CONG. REC. S219-20 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2007) (statement of Sen. Reid). In his
introduction speech to S.1, Senate Majority Leader Henry Reid (D-NV) stated:
Ethics reform is also the first order of business because it is a clear priority of the
American people. In election day exit polls on November 7, voters spoke loudly and
very clearly about their diminished faith in government. Forty-one percent of voters
named corruption as extremely important in determining whom they would vote for.
Americans want us to purge the Government of undue influence, and they want us to
eliminate the conditions that led to the scandal-making headlines of last year and 2005:
headlines about officials being flown to Scotland for rounds of golf, headlines about
committee chairmen negotiating lucrative lobbying jobs with the industries they
oversee, while working on legislation important to those industries; and, of course,
headlines about "pay to play" schemes such as the infamous K Street Project, where
jobs and campaign donations were traded for legislation and other official acts.
Id at S220.
121. See 153 CONG. REC. S10,723-24 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007) (roll-call vote).
122. See 153 CONG. REC. H9210 (daily ed. July 31, 2007) (roll-call vote).
123. Lobby Reform Bill Passes House Without Grassroots Lobbying Disclosure,
OMBWATCH.ORG (May 30, 2007), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3303. Although HLOGA
affects lobbyists, many of the changes made were directly aimed at lawmakers. HLOGA
increased the "cooling off" period for senators to two years and added a one-year cooling off
period for Senate staff. 18 U.S.C. § 207(e) (Supp. II 2009). It also bars elected officials and staff
from accepting gifts and travel from lobbyists, subject to exceptions made by each chamber's
rules. 2 U.S.C. § 1613 (Supp. 112009).
124. 2 U.S.C. § 1604(a). HLOGA also required that lobbyists specifically disclose any
political contributions made directly by the lobbyist to a member of Congress in excess of $200.
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4. National Association of Manufacturers v. Taylor: National Association of
Manufacturers Fails to Overturn HLOGA on First Amendment Grounds
Given the greater demand for specificity and increased filings, inevitably,
HLOGA was tested in the courts. Soon after its passage, the National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) filed suit against the Secretary of the
Senate challenging the constitutionality of the new law in National Association
of Manufacturers v. Taylor.125 NAM challenged the constitutionality of a
number of provisions.' The district court rejected NAM's argument that
HLOGA was constitutionally deficient and held that HLOGA's provisions
127
were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government purpose. NAM
appealed. 128
The District of Columbia Circuit handed down its opinion in the case in
September 2009.129 The court affirmed the findings of the district courto
30 and
ruled that the HLOGA provisions NAM challenged did not interfere with
NAM's constitutional rights to petition, associate, and engage in free speech. 13 1
The court utilized a strict scrutiny review of HLOGA.132
Id. § 1604(d). Prior to this adoption, the federal-election rules treated lobbyists no differently
than any other individuals. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006) (defining who must file reports).
125. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., NAM Challenges Constitutionality of Member
Disclosure Law (Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.nam.org/Communications/Articles/2008/02/NAM
ChallengesconstitutionalityofMemberDisclosureLaw.aspx/NAMChallengesConstitutionalityofMe
mberDisclosureLaw.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2011) [hereinafter NAM Press Release].
126. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. V. Taylor (Taylor II), 582 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009). When
certain organizations made contributions to a lobbyist or lobbying organization in excess of a
certain monetary threshold, the LDA required registrants to disclose their information, even if
they were not direct clients. 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2006). This provision generally affected large
trade associations, although some, like NAM, avoided the law because their members'
contributions rarely exceeded the monetary thresholds triggering disclosure. Taylor II, 582 F.3d
at 8. HLOGA, however, reduced the requirements and added a provision affecting non-clients
who "actively participate in the planning, supervision, or control of such lobbying activities." 2
U.S.C. § 1603(b) (Supp. II 2009). This would effectively require organizations like NAM to
disclose their membership lists, which they had previously held private. Taylor II, 582 F.3d at 8.
NAM filed suit, claiming the statute was "vague, overbroad and burdensome" and violated the
First Amendment. NAM Press Release, supra note 125, at 1.
127. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Taylor (Taylor 1), 549 F. Supp. 2d 33, 68 (D.D.C. 2008).
128. Taylor II, 582 F.3d at 1.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 29.
131. Id. at 9, 22.
132. Id. at 16. The court began by focusing on the First Amendment, specifically the level of
scrutiny with which the law should be reviewed. Id at 10. NAM argued in favor of strict
scrutiny, while the government argued in favor of what the court characterized as a "lesser-but-
still-heightened form of scrutiny." Id The court did not decide what the correct level should be,
stating that if the statute could survive strict scrutiny, determining the appropriate test was
unnecessary. Id. at 11.
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The court began its analysis with the first prong of the strict scrutiny test, the
finding of a compelling government interest.1 33 This prong has two parts: first,
determining the government interest, and second, determining whether the
interest is compelling.' 34 The court refused to adopt NAM's argument that the
government's interest was the disclosure of the names of participants in
"stealth coalitions."' 35 The court instead relied on the LDA's justification of
providing increased "public awareness of the efforts of paid lobbyists to
influence the public decisionmaking process," which had not been amended or
altered by HLOGA.1 36
In determining whether the government's interest in the level of disclosure
mandated in HLOGA was compelling, the court looked to the precedent
established in United States v. Harriss, which held that disclosure was
"designed to safeguard a vital national interest."1 37 The court also looked to
Buckley v. Valeo, the celebrated campaign finance reform case.'38 Both of
these cases supported the District of Columbia Circuit's finding that
"[t]ransparency in government, no less than transparency in choosing our
government, remains a vital national interest in a democracy." 39
The District of Columbia Circuit then probed the question of whether the
government took the action to achieve the governmental interest proffered or
whether that interest was simply pretextual. 40 The court quickly disposed of
this argument.141
The court then addressed the second-prong of strict scrutiny analysis and
rejected NAM's arguments that the steps taken in HLOGA were overbroad or,
alternatively, under-inclusive of the desired congressional results.142 The court
133. Id.
134. Id
135. Id NAM cited comments from elected officials, including Congressman Lloyd Doggett
(D-TX) and Senator Joe Lieberman (1-CT), during the floor debates of HLOGA regarding certain
ad hoc groups which came together specifically to lobby on particular pieces of legislation, but
whose actual membership and lobbying goals were obscured by "innocent sounding names." Id
at 11 n.7.
136. Id at 16.
137. Id.; see United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954).
138. Taylor II, 582 F.3d at 16; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).
139. Taylor II, 582 F.3d at 14.
140. Id. at 17.
141. Id The court noted that,
[o]n its face, it certainly appears to [advance the compelling government interest]. By
requiring registrants to disclose the "name, address, and principal place of business" of
any organization that contributes the monetary threshold and actively participates in the
planning, supervision, or control of the registrant's lobbying activities, the section
provides the very information-"who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and
how much"-that Harriss found to be "a vital national interest."
Id at 16 (quoting Harriss, 347 U.S. at 626).
142. Id at 20. The second prong of the strict scrutiny examination probes whether the action
taken is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest cited. Id. at 20.
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relied on its decision in Blount v. SEC in which it found that "neither a perfect
nor even the best available fit between means and ends is required" to satisfy
strict scrutiny. 143 The court held that the disclosure regime was narrowly
tailored and provided the least restrictive alternative means for Congress to
achieve its goal of greater public disclosure of lobbying practices.14 4
5. The Road Ahead: A New Administration, a New Approach
After almost seventy years of regulation, and despite the changes enacted in
HLOGA just one year prior, 145 lobbying again became a major topic in
American politics during the 2008 presidential campaign. 146 Even before the
election, Senator John McCain and then-Senator Barack Obama exchanged
letters to discuss lobbying reform issues. 147 The promises made by Obama
during the campaign led to new lobbying prohibitions in his Administration. 14 8
Given Obama's frequent criticism of lobbying during the campaign, the
Obama administration quickly announced new ethical rules for lobbying.149
The President-elect introduced new restrictions on lobbyists during his
transition to the White House. 50 On his first day in office, he quickly adopted
new rules for White House staff that were designed to curb the "revolving
door" issue.151 It was readily apparent that the new administration would be
143. Id. at 17 (quoting Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Blount challenged
the constitutionality of Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board Rule G-37. Blount, 61 F.3d at
939. Rule G-37 prohibited municipal securities brokers from making campaign contributions to
state officials if they were engaged in business together. Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd., Rule G-37
(1994), available at http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-
G-37.aspx# b. The District of Columbia Circuit found that Rule G-37 was narrowly tailored to
effectively advance the compelling government interest of ensuring investors in municipal bonds
were protected from fraud and unfair market practices. Blount, 61 F.3d at 944-47.
144. Taylor II, 582 F.3d at 19-20.
145. See supra Part 1.E.3.
146. See Ralph Dannheisser, McCain, Obama Built Images by Pushing Lobbying
Restrictions, AMERICA.GOV (May 28, 2008), http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/2008/May
20080528084503abretnuh5.785769e-02.html (explaining that Senator McCain and then-Senator
Obama discussed plans to restrict lobbying and campaign financing during their presidential
campaigns).
147. McCain Criticizes Obama on Lobbying Ethics Reform, USATODAY.COM,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-02-06-mccain-obama-x.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2011).
148. See, e.g., Senator Barack Obama, Remarks on Taking Our Government Back at
Manchester, New Hampshire (June 22, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.barackobama
.com/2007/06/22/remarksofsenator barack obam_17.php) (promising stricter regulations on
lobbying if elected); see also Press Release, The Office of the President-Elect, supra note 10
(implementing new lobbying regulations).
149. See Press Release, The Office of the President-Elect, supra note 10.
150. Id.
151. See Obama's First Day: Pay Freeze, Lobbying Rules, MSNBC.COM (Jan. 21, 2009),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ld/28767687; Obama Team Announces New Rules on Lobbyists,
MSNBC.coM (Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27665871/ns/politics-whitehousel
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tougher on lobbyists and more skeptical of lobbying than any administration in
recent memory.
6. The Administration Prohibits Certain Oral Communications by Lobbyists
on the Stimulus
On March 20, 2009, following the passage of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (Stimulus), President Obama issued an executive
memorandum entitled "Ensuring Responsible Spending of Recovery Act
Funds."'s3 The memorandum included new rules regarding communications
between registered lobbyists and executive branch officials regarding
Stimulus-funding proposals. 154
Section 3(a) of the memorandum requires registered lobb ists to put any
views that they wish to express to an official in writing. I Section 3(b)
requires executive-branch officials to "inquire whether any of the individuals
or parties appearing or communicating concerning such particular project,
application, or applicant [under the Recovery Act] is a lobbyist registered
under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995." 156 Although the memorandum
does not prohibit a lobbyist from asking general Stimulus questions, it does
require the executive-branch official to provide a written document that
includes the date and time of the discussion, names of both the lobbyist and the
official questioned, and a description of the conversation. 157 All written
communications-from either the lobbyist or the official-must be posted
(discussing the "revolving door" between the government and lobbyists). The President made
ending the revolving-door practice a key priority and, shortly after he was elected, the transition
team began developing and implementing plans to minimize the impact of lobbyists on the new
Administration. See Press Release, The Office of the President-Elect, supra note 10. On January
21, 2009, his first full day in office, President Obama announced the first lobbying restrictions on
executive-branch political appointees. See Obama's First Day, supra.
The President also issued Executive Order 13,490, entitled "Ethics Commitments by
Executive Branch Personnel," which required all executive-branch appointees to sign a pledge
that, among other things, barred them from accepting gifts from registered lobbyists while in
office. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009). It also prevented appointees
from working on matters on which they lobbied during the previous two years. Id Finally, it
barred appointees from lobbying "any covered executive branch official or non-career Senior
Executive Service appointee for the remainder of the administration." Id These new lobbying
reforms were designed, in the words of President Obama, "to help restore faith in government,
without which we cannot deliver the changes that we were sent here to make." Obama's First
Day, supra. Not only were these rules designed to target lobbyists, they were also designed to
deter executive branch officials from using their ties to become lobbyists after leaving the
administration. Id. The constitutionality and effectiveness of these bans are beyond the scope of
this Comment.
152. Obama's First Day, supra note 151.
153. Presidential Memorandum of March 20, supra note 11, at 12,531.
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publicly on the agency's website within three business days of the
communication.'58
11. APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S ACTIONS
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."' 59 Although the Supreme Court has
trod carefully around the constitutional protections afforded to lobbying,
lobbying regulations are firmly grounded in the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence.160 And though the Court has never expressly stated that there is
a "constitutional right to lobby,"' 61 it has analyzed the various lobbying-
disclosure regimes with a careful eye toward their impact on First Amendment
protections. Thus, if the Obama lobbying rules were challenged, courts
158. Id. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) later clarified the President's
Memorandum with its own memorandum. Memorandum from the Office of Mgmt. and Budget
on Interim Guidance Regarding Communications with Registered Lobbyists About Recovery Act
Funds to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies 1 (Apr. 7, 2009), available
at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda-fy2009/m-09-16.pdf. The
memorandum clarifies the President's March 20 Memorandum and notes exceptions to the
reporting requirements for widely attended events and oral communications on purely logistical
matters. Id. at 1, attach. 1-2. This memorandum triggered criticism from a variety of public
affairs organizations. See JACOB R. STRAUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LOBBYING THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH: CURRENT PRACTICES AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 11-12 (2009); Letter
from Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, Am. Civil Liberties Union, and Am.
League of Lobbyists, to Gregory B. Craig, White House Counsel (Mar. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.alldc.org/pdfs/033109WhiteHouseLetter.pdf.
In response to this heavy criticism, OMB issued a memorandum on July 24, further clarifying
the President's March 20 Memorandum. Memorandum from the Office of Mgmt. and Budget on
Updated Guidance Regarding Commc'n with Registered Lobbyists About Recovery Act Funds
to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies 1 (July 24, 2009), available
at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda-fy2009/m09-24.pdf. This
memorandum expanded the ban on oral communications to all individuals outside the federal
government, even those who are not registered lobbyists. Id. at 1, attach. 1.
Although both the April 7 and July 24 memoranda purport to explain the President's March 20
Memorandum, both include language that is absent from the text of the March 20 Memorandum.
For example, the justification for the ban on any oral communication with individuals outside of
the federal government is found nowhere in the text of the March 20 Memorandum. Given the
additional constitutional concerns that arise with such a broad ban on petitioning rights for
individuals outside of the government, this Comment focuses only on the March 20
Memorandum's express requirements.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
160. See Allard, supra note 7, at 39.
161. See Thomas, supra note 17, at 150, 172.
162. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1954).
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would probably apply strict scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the
Administration's lobbying rule regarding the Stimulus.
National Association of Manufacturers v. Taylor provides a foundation for a
strict scrutiny analysis in the First Amendment petition/speech context.164
Under that analysis, the first inquiry is whether the Administration has a
compelling interest in banning oral communications with lobbyists.'ss
A. The Government's Interests in Adopting the Lobbying Ban Are Poorly
Articulated and Redundant
The President's March 20 Memorandum lists three specific justifications for
the additional rules regarding lobbying regulations involving the
Stimulus-grant awards. 166 First, the new rules "provide public transparency
and accountability of expenditures."l67 Second, the new rules promote good
government by ensuring that Stimulus grants are awarded based on merit,
rather than "improper influence." 168 Third, the new rules "empower"
executive-department officials to exercise their discretion to ensure that
Stimulus funds promote "job creation, economic recovery, and other purposes
of the [Stimulus Act]."l 69 Compared to the congressional findings supporting
the lobbying-disclosure statutes, 170 the justifications in the March 20
Memorandum are exceedingly thin.
The first justification of stricter lobbying restrictions discussed in the March
20 Memorandum-transparency in government-is the most likely to satisfy
strict scrutiny because the Memorandum extensively details specific disclosure
requirements designed to provide public access to portions of the Stimulus
grant process.171
The second justification would likely not satisfy strict scrutiny because the
Memorandum fails to explain the difference between "improper influence" and
"proper influence."1 72 The Memorandum does not ban lobbyist influence
163. See Kathryn L. Plemmons, "Lobbying Activities" and Presidential Pardons: Will
Legislators'Efforts to Amend the LDA Lead to Increasingly Hard-Lined Jurisprudence?, 18 BYU
J. PuB. L. 131, 135-36 (2003).
164. Nat'1 Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Taylor (Taylor 11), 582 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 944 (D.C. Cit. 1995)).
165. Id.




170. See Taylor II, 582 F.3d at 19-20 (discussing the goals Congress intended to achieve by
passing stronger restrictions on lobbying).
171. See Presidential Memorandum of March 20, supra note 11, at 12,532-33. A court
would probably find the means narrowly tailored for a compelling government interest. See
Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
172. See generally Presidential Memorandum of March 20, supra note I 1.
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entirely; it simply requires that all lobbyist statements be made in writing.1
Thus, under the President's justification, only oral communications are capable
of being an "improper influence." 7 4 This rule is not narrowly tailored: a bribe
can just as easily be transmitted via e-mail as it can be in person or over the
telephone. The President's failure to articulate what constitutes improper
influence, rather than simply influence or even proper influence, weakens this
justification of the government's interest.
Finally, the interest of "empowering" executive-branch officials is a nullity;
under the Stimulus, executive-branch officials have statutory discretion to
grant awards. 1 Congress has already delegated to the executive officials
power to exercise their discretion to promote the goals of the Stimulus. 176
These additional rules do not provide any greater discretion or empowerment
for executive officials than the statutory empowerment already given by
Congress. Compared to the congressional findings outlined in United States
v. Harriss and National Association of Manufacturers v. Taylor, President
Obama's explanations of the government's interest in enacting the additional
rules are poorly articulated and redundant.
In order to survive a strict scrutiny analysis, the government must
demonstrate a sufficiently compelling interest to justify encroaching upon First
Amendment rights. 179 Although the Supreme Court ruled in Harriss and
Buckley that lobbying-disclosure statutes contain sufficiently compelling
interests to justify their impact on the First Amendment, the issue presented by
the March 20 Memorandum is not simply one of disclosure.' 80 Although the
transparency justification may be sufficient to support the increased disclosure
requirements, it does not justify the adverse impact a blanket ban on oral
communication would have on First Amendment rights. 81 Any contact
between lobbyists and executive-branch officials concerning the Stimulus must
173. Id. at 12,533.
174. See id. at 12,531, 12,533.
175. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115,
116 ("The President and the heads of Federal departments and agencies shall manage and expend
the funds made available in this Act so as to achieve the purposes specified in subsection (a),
including commencing expenditures and activities as quickly as possible consistent with prudent
management.").
176. Id. Notably, Congress used the mandatory "shall" rather than the permissible "may."
177. Compare Presidential Memorandum of March 20, supra note 11, with American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
178. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954); Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Taylor
(Taylor 11), 582 F.3d 1, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
179. Taylor II, 582 F.3d at 11 (quoting Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
180. Compare Harriss, 347 U.S. at 626 (reasoning that the LDA's disclosure requirements
"safeguard a vital national interest"), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam)
(finding "limitling] the . . . appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial
contributions" a sufficient justification), with Presidential Memorandum of March 20, supra note
I1, at 12,533 (requiring disclosure of a communication's substance for transparency).
181. Cf Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
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be disclosed under HLOGA, regardless of the new rules articulated in the
Memorandum.182 The only difference between HLOGA and these new rules is
the disclosure not only of the contact's existence, but also of its substance.
Requiring the disclosure of a contact's substance is a novel approach, but it
raises the specter of content-based speech regulation.184 Further, the "chilling
effect" that such a substance-based disclosure requirement would have on
lawful petitioning of the government is not justified.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Harriss focused on ensuring that the public
knew "who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much" the
are spending to influence public officials-not on what was being said.'
Under the March 20 Memorandum, the government focuses not on who is
lobbying-which would already be captured in LDA- and HLOGA-mandated
disclosure forms-but on what is being said.' 87 By focusing on the contact's
substance, the administration skirts the edge of content-based speech
regulation.
B. The Ban on Oral Communications Is Not An Effective Means of Advancing
the Government's Interest
If one considers the March 20 Memorandum's justifications as compelling
government interests, the next step in strict scrutiny analysis is to determine
whether the steps taken effectively advance those interests.
Although the various disclosure requirements on executive-branch officials
would effectively advance transparency,'8 the lobbyist-communication ban
182. 2 U.S.C. § 1604 (Supp. 112009).
183. Compare id. (requiring disclosure of a contact), with Presidential Memorandum of
March 20, supra note II (requiring disclosure of both the contact and the substance of the
communication).
184. See Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
185. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 345 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
186. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954). The focus on "who" is doing the
speaking may represent unlawful suppression of political speech based on the speaker's status.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898-99. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
the Supreme Court struck down blanket prohibitions on the use of corporate funds to further
corporate political speech for or against candidates for federal public office. Id. at 917. The
Court specifically noted:
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against
attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. . . . Prohibited, too, are restrictions
distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not
others. . . . As instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to
control content.
Id. at 898-99 (citations omitted).
187. Presidential Memorandum of March 20, supra note II, at 12,533.
188. Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Taylor (Taylor II), 582 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
189. See supra text accompanying note 171.
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may not do so. HLOGA requires lobbyists to disclose who they are lobbyin
for, which agencies they are lobbying, and how much they are being paid.
The ban on oral communications does little to further transparency; it simply
stifles communication.191
C. The Lobbying Ban Is Not Narrowly Tailored
Finally, in order to survive strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate
that the questioned regulation is narrowly tailored.192 As the District of
Columbia Circuit noted in Blount v. SEC, a regulation is narrowly tailored
when no less-restrictive alternative would accomplish the government's goals
as effectively. 93
There are numerous less-restrictive alternatives that could provide
transparency without the need for blanket bans on oral communications. The
March 20 Memorandum already requires that agencies post written
communications by lobbyists in support of specific projects on their
websitesl 94 and that executive-branch officials document and post summaries
of conversations with lobbyists on "general [Stimulus] policy issues." 95
Therefore, it may be less restrictive simply to require the same documentation
by the government official in all cases, regardless of the content of the
conversation.
In addition, the sole focus on registered lobbyists renders the March 20
Memorandum fatally under-inclusive. It ignores the potential "improper
influence" exerted by non-registered lobbyists on executive officials making
Stimulus-award decisions.196 The justifications made by the administration do
not explain why conversations with registered lobbyists are a greater threat of
"improper influence" than conversations with unregistered, but still interested,
third parties.
D. The Administration's Ban on Oral Communications Does Not Survive a
Strict Scrutiny Analysis
The President has failed to articulate a compelling the government interest in
banning lobbyist conversations regarding Stimulus awards. Further, the
lobbying bans do not effectively advance the government interests that were
proffered as justification for the bans. Finally, given both the existence of
less-restrictive alternatives and the under-inclusiveness of the bans, the
communication bans found in the March 20 Memorandum do not satisfy strict
190. 2 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (Supp. 11. 2009).
191. Cf Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 878.
192. Taylor 1, 582 F.3d at II (quoting Blount, 61 F.3d at 944).
193. Blount, 61 F.3d at 944.
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scrutiny and are therefore unconstitutional infringements on the First
Amendment.
III. PUTTING LOBBYING AND REFORM IN PERSPECTIVE
A significant number of Americans have lost faith in government.197 The
President has shown that he believes lobbyists have played a role in that loss of
faith.198 However, rebuilding faith in the government should not include the
wholesale abrogation of the First Amendment. Absent extortion, blackmail or
bribery, a conversation-even a conversation directly advocating on behalf of
a project or appropriation-should be protected. If that conversation crosses
the line into legitimately illegal territory, it should be prosecuted. But a
conversation between a lobbyist and a bureaucrat should not instantly invite
suspicion of corruption or undue influence. Executive-branch officials still
have the option of simply ignoring these entreaties, just as their legislative-
branch colleagues do.
Further, as the Supreme Court recently noted in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission,
Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content,
moreover, the Government may commit a constitutional wrong when
by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking the right to
speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives
the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive
to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice. The
Government may not by these means deprive the public of the right
and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are
worthy of consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and
speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.199
It seems equally important that executive branch officials not be deprived of
"the right and privilege to determine for [themselves] what speech and
speakers are worthy of consideration." 200
There is a fundamentally American aversion to the censorship of debate, and
this may be the reason why so many disparate groups have criticized the
administration's policies in this area. 20 The Obama administration's
transparency efforts are laudable, but the bans on communications are not.
The trend toward censorship of debate and bans on political speech-even in
as limited a context as lobbying on the Stimulus-represents a step backward
197. Capstrat, Public Policy Polling: Americans Have Little Faith in Government, Big
Business, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (May 19, 2009), http://triangle.bizjoumals.com/triangle/stories/
2009/05/18/daily l7.html.
198. State of the Union Address, supra note 1.
199. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
200. Id
201. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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in the expansion of citizen contact with government. A policy focusing on
registered lobbyists represents another chapter in the long-running _olitical
argument between the government and those who seek to influence it.2
The public has a vague notion of what lobbying is, but generally does not
recognize the difference between law-abiding lobbyists and the Jack
203Abramoffs of the lobbying world. In fact, some call for an outright ban on
all lobbying as the only way to solve the problem. 20 4 As such, attacking
lobbyists and the "special interests" is an easy way to score political points
with broad swaths of the electorate, especially those who do not feel politically
empowered. Yet doing so can cause more damage to government than it
prevents. Lobbyists offer public officials more than campaign contributions;
the most important thing a lobbyist can provide a public official is reliable
information. That information allows officials to make informed decisions
about legislation and helps them prioritize their legislative efforts and draft
legislation that works in the real world, not just on paper.2 06 Lobbying also
helps constituents voice their concerns and solve problems caused by the
government-the exact scenario the right to petition was designed to remedy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the goals of rooting out public corruption and restoring public faith
in the government are laudable, the Obama administration's prohibitions on
lobbyists and citizens interacting with executive-branch employees regarding
the Stimulus violate constitutional protections enshrined in the First
Amendment. The administration's efforts to ensure public transparency are
noble, but an outright conversation ban goes too far toward censorship. The
American people and their government must be ever vigilant to ensure that
efforts to stamp out corruption do not undercut some of the most fundamental
rights upon which our nation was founded.
202. See Presidential Memorandum of March 20, supra note II, at 12,533; see also BYRD,
supra note 5, at 492.
203. See Emily Miller, Obama, Abramoff and "Lobbying Reform," POLITICS DAILY
(May 15, 2009), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/05/15/Abramoff-obama-and-sham-lobbying-
reform/.
204. See, e.g., Heather Dunham, Comment to Some Agencies Set to Implement Lobbyist Ban,
THE HILL (Oct. 13, 2009, 3:55 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/62347-agencies-set-
to-implement-lobbyist-ban.
205. John M. de Figueiredo, Lobbying and Information in Politics, 4 BUS. & POL. 125, 126
(2002).
206. See BYRD, supra note 5, at 508.
532 [Vol. 60:505
